Experts are important actors of organizational control. Nevertheless, experience suggests that they must be controlled as well. This is particularly the case for traders in financial institutions.
5 through their own regulatory mechanisms. The loyalty of experts to professional associations (that is, peer recognition) is often greater than their allegiance to an employer (Orlikowski, 1991) .
It is therefore reasonable to ask how a company can exert control that has already been delegated-a question faced by any organization wishing to control the experts in its employ.
This question is so much challenging that it is probably why the issue of expert control has been subject to so little study.
The question notably resurfaced after the 2008 financial crisis and following the new recommendations of the Bank for International Settlements (Basel II to Basel III) when a community of banking professionals and researchers became aware of the importance of managing operational risk to ensure the effective regulation of banking activities. Research led by the ANR-C2 R (Control Risk Resiliency) consortium mapped operational risk by identifying a number of checkpoints. However, this mapping activity was static, and unable to take into account the evolving risks inherently caused by expert creativity-an observation that redirected the research, which was divided into two study groups. One group sought to identify control mechanisms for routine activities, while the other group, which included one of the authors of the present article, studied emerging risk dynamics tied to trading activities. The research presented here stems from the work of the second group. Our objective is twofold. First, we will demonstrate the reasons for which control mechanisms are doomed to fail when they are designed to regulate expert-initiated activities. This section focuses on defining the notion of expertise and on demonstrating the challenges of controlling financial experts through examples from financial history and recent accounting standards. Practice is an unavoidable element of understanding expert activities. Bureaucratic attempts to control experts in fields such as trading are all the more inefficient given that this category of experts tend to assert their legitimacy by developing increasingly specialized skills. The second objective of this study is to propose an 6 expert control model derived from a case study related to the Control Risk Resiliency project, based on detailed research methods, and with results showing that expert control requires an integrated, dynamic, multidimensional understanding of expert activities. The integration of the case study results raises several issues, which we consider in the discussion section: (i) controlling experts by turning expertise against itself ; and (ii) the need for integrated, dynamic, multidimensional control mechanisms.
Control and Expert Skill Sets: The Need for Multidimensional Reference Frameworks
Although expertise is a fairly well-defined concept (specific and exclusive knowledge) that has been widely studied (Farrington-Darbi & Wilson, 2006) , the identification of experts within companies is relatively lacking (Buton, 2006) . The Latin root of the word, experiti, refers to one who has faced danger (Trépos, 1986) . This definition raises the question of what raises an individual to the status of expert. The notion of expertise furthermore has different and complementary implications depending on the field in question.
From a psychological point of view, to be an expert means to possess above-average knowledge (that is, expertise) in a given field (Chi, 2006) . This superior knowledge may be relative (measured by individual performance) or absolute (measured by level of knowledge).
Professionals in a given field are therefore best positioned to define the qualifications for expertise in their own field because they are able to assess competences (Shanteau, 1992) .
Knowledge alone is not enough, however, and experts must also behave as such in their public presentation, and adopt the characteristic traits of self-confidence and the ability to adapt to new situations (Shanteau, 1988) . Knowledge and skill are the benchmarks controlling the means of accession to the status of expert.
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Sociologically, experts are considered a social construction arising from the dialectical tension between experience and field of representation. An expert is thus acknowledged as a social phenomenon (Evetss, Mieg, & Felt, 2006) embodied in professionalization, practice, or particular situations. From this point of view, expert control is limited by the dynamics of status construction (Selinger & Crease, 2006) . How is it possible to control that which is the process of being shaped?
In management science, an expert is a professional who excels in his or her field, and whose specific knowledge is based in skills acquired as a result of considerable personal investment (Lelebina & Sardas, 2011 ). An expert's knowledge is a strategic asset for his or her company. An expert may be creative (Fablet & Lacaze, 2014) , which is not necessarily true for all professionals, and that creativity may be put to good use by the company, notably to avoid or undermine control mechanisms.
Regardless of the approach and the underlying characteristics that define an expert, experts are predisposed to stand as major players in implementing and applying control mechanisms and, paradoxically, their above-average knowledge allows them to innovatively sidestep regulations, or at the very least rise above them while complying with them. This paradox gives rise to extremely complex situations that conventional representations of control cannot satisfactorily grasp. An integrated, dynamic, and multidimensional approach is preferable.
Expert creativity and the challenge of traditional control and regulation mechanisms
Researchers with an interest in knowledge professionals (Bouchez, 2006) have generally defined experts in opposition to creative individuals. Experts, such as commercial bankers, solve complex problems using skills, while creative people, such as design professionals, offer innovative solutions. Experts can therefore be said to rely on their knowledge base to practice a profession without innovating. Yet experts are also forced to expand their knowledge base by 8 creating products, processes, or standards that only their professional community is able to understand and verify. External, professional regulations prevail over internal, company regulations (Montagna, 1968) . Thévenet (2006, p. 20) noted that experts are autonomous-that is, they operate at "a distance from company regulations, principles, and orders." Autonomy rests the central challenge of expert control, since experts fall outside legitimate company authority. Experts are the reference in their field, and must allow their employer to develop and improve based on their knowledge. Yet more often than not, experts remain solitary, working beyond the governance and control bodies of their employers and environments. Instead, professional organizations, whether formal (for instance, the French Ordre des Experts Comptables) or informal (front-office directors in trading rooms) confer and legitimize expert status. These control mechanisms (Charrier, 2014) are parallel or external to the company, overriding company mechanisms to exert authority over experts. Abernethy and Stoelwinder (1985) also highlighted the need to recruit professionals to control complex processes. However, the control process itself is at odds with the autonomy of the experts in charge of those control processes. Conflicts arise as soon as professionals who seek to preserve or increase their economy are faced with bureaucratic or administrative systems.
Successful control requires the implementation of a system to regulate the economy of experts-a laudable solution in principle, but of which the particularities of implementation are seldom explored.
Experts have a paradoxical relationship with control. On one hand, experts are called upon to regulate their peers' activity, with professional regulations and procedures filling in any gaps. On the other hand, experts may sidestep the standards they and their peers have established, using their creativity to implement solutions adapted to a more complex world (to say nothing of 9 the simple attraction of technical complications or personal interests). Experts are potentially uncontrollable controllers. This paradox is a considerable challenge for organizations that rely frequently on experts.
Financial history and recent banking and market events highlight the difficulty of controlling experts, notably because of their creativity (Meric & Sfez, 2011) . In 1958, the American interest-rate cap, combined with fears of a freeze of Soviet assets held in dollars, led to the creation of a Eurocurrency market on which foreign deposits in domestic currency were not subject to state control. More recently, the 2009 AMF (Autorité des Marchés FinanciersFinancial Markets Regulator) regulations prohibiting short sales of certain securities proved to be ineffective when traders worked around them by trading on markets exempt from these regulations. Regulatory measures, even increasingly rigorously enforced measures, are ineffective because of the leeway they allow experts. For instance, the freedom afforded to banks to assess their market assets using prudential ratio calculations (historical cost or value at risk) also allows them to control the flow of credit (Lamarque & Maurer, 2009 ). Paradoxically, regulations can even stimulate expert creativity. International capital market control mechanisms have always been dodged by financial innovation (Sfez, 2010) .
Practice as a Prerequisite for Understanding Expert Activity
Over 20 years of practice turn has created numerous possibilities in comprehensive research into companies. Reducing, or, conversely, expanding the spectrum of considerations to include different practices, practice, and practitioners (Whittington, 2006 ) allows researchers to question or even overcome dichotomies previously inextricable from management theory. It would also seem that paradoxes opposing theory and practice, management and labour, and strategy and tactics structure to day-to-day operations are often paralyzing (Mintzberg, 1983) .
The syncretism of the subject under study (Bazin, 2011 ) and the recursive relationship of practice with social structures (Giddens, 1984) are likely the main markers of such research. Our understanding of practice is based on the definition of praxis put forth by Castoriadis (1988): doing and the awareness thereof simultaneously, and externally directed. The task is then to study emerging localized and contextualized phenomena, at the level of de Certeau's "whispers of the everyday" ("murmures du quotidien"; 1980), rather than explicit, deliberate processes.
Why is an approach based on a clarification of practice particularly well suited to the control issues surrounding expert activities? First, so-called classic control mechanisms presume a passive, or, at worst, furtive player (see the Rainbarrel case, S. Kerr, 2003) . Control is exerted and, if the net is sufficiently fine, risk is minimized. In the case of expertise (Meric & Sfez, 2011) , the extent of experts' knowledge of processes, products, methods, techniques, and sciences places them beyond the reach of conventional control mechanisms if they so choose.
Along with the informational asymmetry proposed in the theory of the firm (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) , there is an asymmetry of knowledge and skills between the controller and the controlled.
In other words, a considerable portion of experts' activities takes place beyond the purview of the controller not because these activities are hidden, but because they are imperceptible.
For controllers, and in this research approach, relying on a study of expert activity (through procedural or cartographic patterns, for instance) would merely reinforce these blind spots. Activity models cover narrow, static spectra, while expertise is diverse, dynamic, and emerging.
For these reasons, expert-control mechanisms only operate from reflexive control (Giddens, 1984) wielded by the experts themselves. Only experts are able to provide a tangible, intelligible overview of their practices and of the evolution of these practices according to specific constraints and opportunities. This approach requires a method able to capture the reflexive nature of experts' own perspective on their activities, which will be discussed.
Trading: An Expert Activity
Experts practice activities that are hard to control, and trading is no exception. In our research, we have defined a trader as a market operator who manages financial assets on behalf of a bank or clientele (such as product sellers, designers, or structurers) (Jacquillat & Levy-Garboua, 2013 ). In trading rooms, social divisions into front, middle, and back office privilege the transactional (Godechot, 2005) , and it falls to those who are closest to the market-the tradersto carry out the transactions. Transactions are rooted in a social structure that shapes uncertainty into risk (Preda, 2005) . Traders hold a central position in that transformation, and thus can be qualified as experts given the nature of their skills, according to the Castel (1987) criteria for expert representation. According to Castel, there are two models (not mutually exclusive) to represent expert intervention. The classic representation is of an individual mandated to assess a given situation based on his or her knowledge. The alternate model is that of an "instituting" expert, who creates situations through his or her knowledge. Traders may be considered experts in light of both models. The specialization of this professional category by market and by product category places experts first and foremost in a market-assessment situation. This evaluation then leads experts to construct new situations and practices that may lead to financial innovation. The legitimization process for each of these two models is different, and may be used to understand the challenges inherent in trying to control trading. In the mandated expert model, the technical activity of assessing information, based on hyperspecialization, may lead to obverse effects (for instance, underevaluating risk). The instituting expert model leads to professional practices that become implemented standards, the development of which excludes those outside the professional field. According to these two models, experts are characterized by specialized or even esoteric knowledge that leads to a particular division of labour, a phenomenon described in general terms by Reed (1996) : knowledge workers are organized through networks, and adopt power strategies based on the "marketization" of their knowledge. Their skills development hinges on increasing specializations that are difficult to control through bureaucratic measures (Starbuck, 1992) . It is therefore necessary to deploy network control mechanisms that can adapt to the flexibility and economy of knowledge experts. The Control Risk Resiliency (C2R) project exemplifies the challenges of controlling knowledge experts.
Case Study: Operational Risk Control in Bank Trading
Our case study highlights the conflict between the methodology used to establish checkpoints in a mechanistic understanding of banking activities and certain categories of expertise, in particular in the field of trading. Following the research carried out as part of the ANC-C2R and its somewhat disappointing results, a second phase of research has analyzed the reasons for that relative failure. After outlining the complementary C2R research platform, we will present the aspect of the empirical results that highlighted its principal limitations-the controllability of bank trading.
General Research Context: The C2R Control Risk Resilience Project and Understanding Operational Risk
With support from the Pôle de Compétitivité Mondial Finance-Innovation, the Ile-deFrance region and the Ville de Paris, C2R has since 2010 gathered a consortium including two private companies (a software editor and a consultancy firm) and two academic teams from 13 French universities. With a budget of approximately €2 million, this project seeks to develop an operational risk management diagnostic tool for global use by banks. As the Basel Committee indicated, these risks are linked to potential losses due to the inadequacy or failure of internal procedures, to staffing, or to systems, as well as losses due to external events. Operational risk includes data entry errors, handling errors during stock exchange orders, loan defaults due to insufficient client file analysis, as well as massive claims tied to fraud such as the Kerviel case.
The stakes are potentially enormous, because providing proof of adequate risk management in such cases raises the possibility of authorizing a bank, under the Basel I and Basel II workgroup regulations, to lower its prudential capital adequacy ratio by several tenths of a point.
The project hopes to identify approximately 500 key banking control-management checkpoints in order to provide a reference framework for external or internal auditors that is as exhaustive as possible. Very early on, the bulk of project resources were devoted to mapping these checkpoints,
ii based on models of typical banking processes through individual examination of the different business lines defined by the Basel Committee (business financing, retail banks, asset management, etc.).
It was almost immediately apparent that the mapping process served to identify objective and recurrent risk, but not constructed and evolving risk (technical committee meeting minutes, May 7, 2010). From that point on, the professional teams, along with some of their academic colleagues, turned their attention to mapping the processes linked to the most stable and routine business lines: retail banking and business financing. The rest of the project team (including researcher 1) focused on studying risk emergence dynamics in trading as one component of asset management and market activities: trading.
Methods
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Trading activities were considered from an action-based research approach. The objective of the C2R steering committee was to produce control instrumentation interactively with the field itself. The nature of the instrument has not a priori been defined, but it has been requested that the tool developed make the sources of operational risk "visible and intelligible" (Liu, 1997) .
Researcher 1, a member of the C2R team, has gathered primary data (direct observation) and secondary data (technical and steering committee records and notes) during the risk mapping implementation phase. Appendix 1 provides an inventory of sources. A reflexive triangulation mechanism was implemented with researchers 2 and 3, who, by assisting researcher 1 in identifying nonroutine elements in the study data, engaged in an iterative interpretation validation process (Girin, 1989) .
While the practical component opens the door to a variety of research methods (see part IV, Golsorkhi, Rouleau, Seidl, & Vaara, 2015) , the approach selected to study a practice remains ethnographic in order to privilege direct observation of what is in the process of being carried out.
Nevertheless, in the case of this study in particular, such an approach seemed potentially sterile.
As has been mentioned, researchers, like controllers, cannot claim to discern the expertise of their trader subjects through mere physical alteration. Not only is the information held by each party asymmetrical, but the knowledge gap also makes it impossible for researchers to perceive what they have come to study (Devereux, 1967) . Given the considerable degree of operational complexity and instability, participatory observation is impossible: researchers would have to become high-level traders themselves, which is time-consuming, and accessible neither to researchers nor even to middle-office staff. Similarly, nonparticipant observation would not yield results either. At best, the phenomena observed would be impossible to interpret without having attained the subjects' degree of expertise, and at worst the psychological dexterity of the experts 15 would obscure any significant observable detail. Unconstrained insider testimony therefore seemed to be the most appropriate approach. (2015) pointed out that narration is both a practice in and of itself, and a means of accessing the praxis and theories anchored in daily strategic practice. Strategically speaking, narrative reconstructions reveal agency and responsibility assignations. Even if it remains a rationalization, narration nonetheless allows a reflection on past actions (Giddens, 1984; Whittington, 2010) and therefore provides an explanation of the causal relationships that underpin the actions of each individual (Zuber-Skerritt, 2010).
Data were gathered through interviews with four experienced professionals with whom researcher 1 is personally acquainted and who, outside their work hours, agreed to provide a behind-the-scenes perspective on the work of traders, desk officers, asset managers, and branch directors whose work relates to trading. The interviews took place in financial centres in London and Paris and lasted a total of 12 hours. In order to encourage interviewees to speak freely, we are committed to maintaining the anonymity of all interview subjects and of the banks involved.
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The informal nature of the interviews was an integral part of our research methodology in order to not only access a deeper wealth of information, but especially to minimize distortions between spontaneous and elicited narration (Wolfson, 1976) . This approach allows interviewees to reflect on their activities beyond the institutional constraints of both their companies and of the research apparatus.
Each individual was interviewed twice consecutively, for validation and to follow up on issues raised in the first interviews; the two interviews also helped develop trust between the researchers and subjects. In a number of instances, nonroutine facts emerged during the second interview.
In order to eliminate any possible cultural bias in the analysis of disciplinary systems, banks from different nationalities (American, French, Swiss, British) were selected. The results obtained were then compared with secondary field data produced by other scientists in the Paris trading world (Godechot, 2005; Godechot, 2007; Lenglet, 2009 ). These authors notably point out the disparity between traders and middle-office staff, as well as the increasing Balkanization of trading due to the diversification of financial instruments. This gap is not only technical, but also psychological and social. It is not unheard of for desk officers to refer to their middle-office colleagues using derogatory slang for police officers ("boeuf-carotte"; Lenglet, 2009 ).
Particularities of Trading with Regards to Operational Risk: Empirical Results iv
Two categories of results fall under the broader auspices of expert creativity: those results touching on organized and cleared market trading (typically shares, bonds, and nonexotic derivatives), and those related to over-the-counter markets, which tend to be more complex and less transparent, and in which expert creativity has reached even greater levels.
The organized-market interviewees mentioned not only the inadequacy but indeed the harmfulness of a rigid checkpoint structure to attempt to exert some small measure of control over operational risk. A consensus emerged in the interviews on the following major points, some of which apply also to over-the-counter trading (items and transcriptions in Appendix 2):
1. An excess of control nullifies control for both organized-market trading and for over-thecounter activity.
2. Diversity in control mechanisms is more efficient than the creation of endless control mechanisms.
3. A mobile control unit is more efficient in terms of intervention methods and procedures than a static bureaucracy.
4. Controllers must remain unpredictable for traders.
5. The expertise gap between traders and controllers renders control mechanisms ineffectual.
6. The first level of control is subject to social inhibition when compared to the status of traders.
Upper-level control mechanisms are not independent.
A number of risks are specific to over-the-counter trading due to its extreme complexity (items and transcriptions in appendix 3):
8. Too many transactions completed to quickly inevitably give rise to breaches in the control mechanism.
9. Some over-the-counter transactions are too complex to be entered into bank records.
10. Over-the-counter-related risks are not able to be anticipated and therefore not calculable, which undermines banks' overall value-at-risk calculations.
The experts interviewed confidentially and anonymously were candid about their doubts regarding the efficiency of bureaucratic control mechanisms on their own activities. Their ability to analyze loopholes in control mechanisms and to design more efficient alternate mechanisms demonstrates the extent to which the ability to fly under the radar of controllers, at every level, from the middle office to the Inspectorate General (Inspection générale des finances -IGF) is taken into consideration in the reflexive control trading experts exert on their own actions. At no time did the traders or desk officers interviewed attempt to suggest that the examples they raised were anecdotal, isolated, marginal, or nonduplicable. On the contrary, these examples (such as actual risk concealment by the middle office, or the difficulty of booking trades) are part of what traders consider integral to recurrent and reflexive practices. The field of action reveals a praxis that has not become so routine that it is immutable or unconscious: these actions are conscious in the moment at which the trader avoids or subverts regulatory devices, and are sufficiently new to be undetectable by control systems. The gap between routine and innovation, fluid and intangible to outsiders, but familiar to experts, can be divided into three general groups:
 An excess of information and complexity, leading to limited rationality affecting control (points 1, 2, 6, 9, and 11).
 The limits of automation, which cannot replace this limited rationality (points 3 and 10).
 The need for a strategic and tactical attitude, irreducible to procedural implementation (points 3, 4, 5, and 7).
Access to the reflections of experts speaking confidentially outside of their institutional context highlighted the intrinsic double limitation of trading controls. On one hand, controlling traders is inefficient as soon as it is taken on by external professionals, due to traders' creativity, which in itself helps legitimize their participation in their peer network (that is, other market professionals). On the other hand, the intrinsic agility of traders, as highlighted here, nullifies any of the usual bureaucratic tools for use by ill-intentioned individuals. The quality-assurance risk management systems with predetermined checkpoints typical of classic retail banking business lines truly leave a company defenseless. Finally, expert-control dynamic are permanently disjointed from the evolving practices implemented according to expert creativity. Overcoming this double limitation is the central objective of any expert-control attempt.
Discussion: Trading Expertise-A Manageable Operational Risk?
These research results confirm first and foremost the hypothesis according to which an expert activity such as trading is likely to engender immeasurable operational risks (Meric & Sfez, 2011) . Meric and Sfez, like Lamarque and Maurer (2009) before them, suggest that, beyond flat metrics and mapping, controlling these risks is a management problem. If we grant that the object of such research could be to produce engineering-level knowledge (Martinet & Pesqueux, 2013) , the reflexive expression of trading practices could provide the basis for the development of new control mechanisms. A preliminary interpretation of these results lies in the recommendations of the experts themselves. Their diagnosis is aligned with the solutions proposed for cybercrime by Guarnieri and Przyswa (2012) : to the shadowy nature of the internet and the elusive behaviours to which it gives rise, "collection agencies" of a sort must be created to turn a likelihood into a risk (Beck, 2008) . Secondly, therefore, new control mechanisms must be multidimensional, integrated, and dynamic.
How to Control the Experts: Turning Expertise against Itself
The nature of operational risk management (Lamarque & Maurer, 2009) suggests that a solution may be found in informal control-that is, in power relationships as opposed to authority (Bouquin, 2011) . In their literature review on fraud, Le Maux, Smaïli, and Ben Amar (2013) also suggested that positive-accounting hypotheses did not provide adequate solutions, notably because traders currently enjoy a considerable margin of authority under their superiors. When 20 questioned, by their own initiative, they suggested reversing this relationship by beating them at their own game.
Research has revealed that the difficulty of controlling experts arises from their creativity, the lack of transparency in their activities, and their professional dexterity. In response to the foregoing, an interactive and diagnostic control mechanism (Simons, 1994) should be equally lacking in transparency (not in its results, but in its operational application), constantly creative, fluid, and unpredictable. Control mechanisms should give rise to practices that are constantly reinvented, rather than systematically mirroring local innovations through regulations and routines that are obsolete as soon as they're implemented (Sfez, 2010) .
Such practices, which it is not our place to define because they must be developed in a particular context by competent stakeholders in fields of expertise that are extremely specific, require a rethinking of the administration and governance of banking controls. As Guarnieri and Przyswa (2012) suggested that for high-level cybercrime, pools of experts including high-level traders should be gathered to recommend control mechanisms to those able to wield them. Due to fixed and especially to variable bonuses, it is hard to imagine that traders could step into the role of controllers. Expertise in the field of trading furthermore quickly becomes obsolete. An oversight and advisory board may be preferable. Traders themselves furthermore suggest that desk hierarchies give rise to asymmetrical risks between controllers and the positions they control. Banking control governance should strive to re-establish some symmetry, and ensure that controllers' careers are not threatened if they denounce reprehensible or potentially harmful practices..
How to Control the Traders? The Need for Integrated, Dynamic,
Multidimensional Control Mechanisms
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Can the complexity inherent in expert control be satisfactorily addressed through control mechanisms, tools, or structures? Traditional control mechanisms tend to be discounted because they are one-dimensional, and due to the weakness of their foundational model (Hofstede, 1981) , which does not reflect or at best oversimplifies complex situations. Projects like C2R devote most of their budgets to such approaches based on checkpoint-based methods such as COSO framework-inspired scales and audit and internal verification best practices. A performance assessment process based on expert knowledge could be considered, or a mechanism to reduce the blocking ability of a given category of experts, but it is difficult to conceive of a series of operations able to address both problems simultaneously.
Modal or leverage approaches to control refer back to the rational foundations of control (Weber, 1971) and to the modality of action (the question of how, Chiapello, 1996; Simons, 1984) . Modes furthermore indicate a system of focal points used to analyze a specific practice, while leverage is activated sequentially. Their interactions, by contrast, either fade into the background or are absent from the proposed theoretical frameworks. In this regard, these approaches are more global than integrative-that is, they provide an overall perspective.
Would an integrative approach (for instance, a systemic approach; Anthony, 1965) to control be sufficient to mitigate the difficulty of controlling experts? Perhaps not, since systemic approaches base their actions on multitemporal and transorganizational scales. Expert creativity has an impact both within and beyond the organization, as the examples above illustrate (professional legitimacy versus company loyalty). They are furthermore based on distinct timelines or time structures (Orlikowski & Yates, 2002) , which control systems must take into account. For instance, a trader might design an extremely short-term arbitrage gain operation, in keeping with a long-term portfolio management strategy. Alternatively, and more prosaically, 22 speculation reveals anticipatory situations in which time and amplitude belong only to the market experts involved.
Beyond procedural or systemic approaches, these constraints call for an understanding of control dynamics within and outside of companies. A dynamic approach refers first and foremost to the evolving, transitory nature of the situations that must be controlled. In this regard, Hatchuel and Weill (1992) pointed out that it would be fallacious to include expert behaviour in the stability of a strategic framework, and preferred instead to see control-related schemes as "the transitory effects of a regulatory system operating within the permanent interaction of knowledge" (Hatchuel & Weill, p. 106) . These dynamics also point to the interactions that govern the organization, and its relationship to the environment (Liu, 2007; Morin, 1991) . The diagnostic and analytical frameworks derived must meet at least three requirements. First, they must not over-personalize control dynamics, lest they miss the systemic effects produced independently of stakeholders' intentions. Secondly, they must not be limited to a single timeline, since experts' ability to manipulate the short, intermediate and long term would fall beyond the scope of the analyses. Finally, they must not be limited to a fixed organizational perimeter, lest the role of more or less formal expert networks, for instance, not be taken into consideration. To meet these requirements, a representation combining various temporal and spatial issues must be considered.
Conclusion: Explaining Expert Practices in order to Control Them
Considering traders to be representative of a particular class of experts, it is necessary to approach the control of their activities through their own reflexive narrative of their practices.
When Beck (2008) suggested that a diffuse threat be transformed into a tangible risk through a "collection agency," he is referring to the hold of science over society. This current research suggests that various trading expertise is not subject to simple modelling, and requires knowledge arising from extremely specific experience. By explaining the multiple dimensions and timelines according to which traders conceive of their practice, it would seem that only traders are able to provide avenues for designing the mechanisms to control their own activities; they even outline the causalities that shape their day-to-day professional lives, reaching a consensus on the representation of an opaque, fluid, random, and creative control, similar to their own practice.
Trading experts' conception of their own profession also highlights the necessity of basing such a control mechanism on a multidimensional framework. The logic of these requirements, as well as the multiple timelines from which they arise, must be explained before particular control mechanisms can be developed. Such an approach has the advantage of not reducing the complexity of the control dynamics in financial institutions. It allows not only the understanding of the distinct logic according to which controllers and the controlled operate, but also offers the possibility of understanding how these seemingly distinct logical systems interact to give rise to new forms of operational or financial risk.
A future avenue for research would be the design, based on the same data, of a method able to represent these multiple dimensions and timelines in order to restore the complexity of causalities at work in expert practices. ii The entirety of the project's official documents and deliverables, including technical committee ("Cotec") and steering committee ("Copil") meeting minutes, as well as handwritten notes taken by one of the study authors during these meetings, notably showing any controversial or nonconsensual points in regards to which official documents are naturally less explicit once said controversies have been resolved. Procedural and checkpoint maps have also been kept, and are covered by a confidentiality clause.
iii Barring breaches of this anonymity, all handwritten interview and meeting notes are available to the scientific community. Interviewees agreed to reread their comments and to amend them if necessary, but did not agree to be recorded.
iv Partial results of this empirical study had previously been published in an academic journal (author), and in a professional journal (author).
